ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
With many security breaches hitting the news [21, 31] , the field of Information Security (IS), which focuses on protecting the confidentiality, integrity and availability of information [14] , has attracted a lot of attention in recent years. In the Netherlands 18% of all Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) are hit by cyberattacks each year, which costs the Dutch business sector around € 100,000 in damages per organization [30] . Despite all this attention and high financial impact, risk awareness under SMEs is low and risk mitigation is equally a low priority. In addition, SMEs rarely have the resources, time and budget available to address the complexity of risk mitigation [9, 37] and have to deal with security mainly designed for large enterprises, while the risks are just as pressing for SMEs.
In the past decades, the ISO2700x series has emerged as the global standard for Information Security [18] . This standard, consisting of 450 items and 9 focus areas addresses the most pressing problems regarding information security, providing organizations with a complete overview of best practices for their risk mitigation strategy. In parallel to this standard, a number of frameworks have been developed to address more specific company needs, for example by addressing multinationals through the COBIT framework or governmental toolkits like the NIST SP800 [14] . Unfortunately, due to the complexity and extensiveness of these frameworks SMEs rarely reach a fully implemented standard and fall back to ad-hoc implementations of specific focus areas and quick-wins. 
BACKGROUND
To aid SMEs in improving their Information Security, Spruit & Roeling [33] developed the Information Security Focus Area Maturity (ISFAM) model. The ISFAM is a focus area oriented maturity matrix, originally proposed by Steenbergen et al. [34] as a standard method for incremental process improvement. In this type of maturity matrix, there are a fixed number of maturity levels. Each process, identified by a focus area, is assigned its own number of progressively more mature capabilities.
In the ISFAM model, as shown in figure 1 , there are 12 maturity levels and 13 focus areas. In these focus areas, a total of 64 capabilities (A-E) are assigned at the various maturity levels. The assessment of the maturity level is executed through a survey or a directed interview with an expert. The ISFAM model covers the complete domain of information security within SMEs. They overlap in part with chapters from CISSP, ISO 2700x, Information Security Frameworks, the Standard of Good Practice (IOC), and the IBM Security Framework [33] .
Although extensive and relatively fine-grained, the ISFAM model remains rather rigid by design as it does not incorporate the unique set of characteristics of each SME in its maturity assessment. This can be an issue in information security, as the risks and threats differ significantly between an SME with two employees and one with 200. This results in certain capabilities not being applicable or out of place, depending on organizational characteristics such as organization size and amount of revenue. In practice, SMEs will often not be able to reach a higher maturity level because subsequent capabilities are too difficult to implement and perhaps more importantly, they become discouraged by having to wade through capabilities which are not applicable for their business or not deemed relevant within their business sector. In order to overcome these issues, maturity models such as the ISFAM should incorporate organizational characteristics into their core design much like Bekkers et al. [4] did in the field of Software Product Management. Although Bekkers et al. use the term Situational Factors, in their quantitative analysis they measure internal organizational characteristics.
The use of organizational characteristics to segment organizations is not particularly new, as early as 1972-and possibly earlier-academics used organizational characteristics in an effort to model factors that contribute to decision making. In the field of IT, Thong & Yap [36] used organizational characteristics such as organization size, competitiveness of the environment and information density to investigate the adoption of IT in SMEs. In recent years the fields of CRM adoption [22] , Knowledge Management [39] and Sourcing [28] have shown the use of OCs to cluster and segment. In the field of information security, the necessity of taking into account organizational characteristics has proven to be significant [6] and academics have identified numerous factors in a wide variety of domains, such as financial [8, 23] , the complexity and scale of the IT environment [15, 29, 38] , and to what extent businesses deal with privacy related information [14, 38] . Organizational characteristics thus indirectly influence the object of measurement within an organization. These can be internal factors, such as the amount of employees employed, and the amount of revenue generated, as well as external factors such as the sector the organization operates in or the geographic location of a firm. These characteristics can then be modeled in such a way that they apply the correct weights to the focus areas in new and existing maturity models. These weights allow for a more flexible maturity matrix and consequently a more realistic model. The goal of this research is, therefore, to identify which Organizational Characteristics (OCs) are relevant in the field of SME Information Security. This paper is organized as follows: in the next chapter the research approach is discussed, after which we describe the identified OCs. In the third section, we discuss the evaluation of the factors based on iterative interviews. We conclude with a discussion, conclusion, and factors for future research.
RESEARCH APPROACH
The research described in this paper follows the design science theory [26] by using two design processes, namely the development followed by the evaluation of an artifact, also referred to as the instantiation. These steps have been placed in the comprehensive framework by Hevner et al. [16] Information Systems Research Framework for Design Science. The Design Science research methodology is based on the idea of repetitive cycles of improving the object of research based on evaluations. The envisioned artifact-the organizational characteristics model for information security in SMEs-is defined based on environmental factors and the state-of-the-art knowledge base. Identifying the OCs is done following a three step approach ( Figure 2 ). The first step in creating the artifact is to determine the set of OCs through a systematic literature review, after which we identify appropriate levels of measurement for each OC. The last step is the iterative evaluation of the OCs through expert interviews. In the following sections the research approach is elaborated on in more detail. The results of these steps are discussed in the subsequent chapters. 
FINDING THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
In order to identify the OCs, a literature search was executed. We used DBLP and Google Scholar to execute our systematic literature review using the following combination of keywords indicated in table 1. Important to note is that information security, besides being discussed by a broad and active research community, is also a field where professionals and information security practitioners write and publish many well respected white papers and case studies. Therefore, an additional search through the databases of the World Bank, the European Central Bank, Audit-, ISO-and COBIT-communities was performed to find articles and papers concerning SMEs in general as well as information security in a SME setting in particular. An example can be found when looking at the ISO implementation guideline [2] , which addresses many organizational characteristics that should be taken into account when trying to reach ISO 27000x certification. When selecting papers, a first selection was made based on title. Only papers with a title including keywords from all three groups were selected. In the consecutive step relevance was double checked by studying the abstract. The papers matching the criteria were then fully read. From these papers the factors were extracted and clustered on similarity, which resulted in a list of unique factors. From the extraction step onwards, the authors double checked the factors on correctness and clustering. The total set of clusters formed the basis for the list of unique OCs. In the selection process of these OCs, both measurability-"is the characteristic quantifiable?"-and soundness-"does it occur in multiple sources or through intuition and common sense?"-were accounted for. This list was then used for the iterative interviews evaluating the characteristics.
DEFINING MEASUREMENT LEVELS
Each organizational characteristic in the final list is described in detail in an effort to streamline the semi-structured interviews in the next step. This description includes measurement levels, which are a one-to-one operationalization of their underlying parameters, where possible. Regarding the measurement levels that comprise a certain OC, consider the following example for further clarification: SMEs are generally categorized as either freelancers (and other one-man businesses), micro organizations (2-9 employees), small businesses (10-49 employees), and medium businesses (50-250) [3, 35] . These different sizes of SMEs are the parameters or the combined measurement level, which comprises the OC "Number of Employees Employed". In defining the measurement levels, three goals were upheld:
1. Obtain a relatively high-level of measurement which bins the parametric range into around three to six increasingly more mature, ordinal levels. 2. The parameters should be easy to understand yet be as descriptive as possible. 3. Parameters should be mutually exclusive and commonly exhaustive.
These measurement levels are derived from the literature; preferably from the results of the systematic review in step one as this assures a peer-reviewed context. However, the literature gathered did not always specify the OC in such detail that parameters, and thus measurement levels, could be obtained. In these cases a specific search for literature was executed, adding the terms: "measurement", "measurement level" and/or "parameter" to the initial search on DBLP and Google Scholar. In certain cases the literature couldn't provide the authors with an acceptable level of measurement. These cases can be categorized as follows:
 Unavailable. The literature did not provide any indication of measurement levels. In this case common sense was applied, after which it was discussed with the interviewed experts.  Lacking Consensus. The literature did not provide a consensus. Here the interviewees were asked to provide their opinions.  Error in Context. The level of measurement was obtained from literature in a different field than information security or information technology. Depending how context-sensitive a level of measurement is, it was discussed with the experts.
During the iterative interviews, new OCs and their measurement levels, could be proposed. During these interviews, each interviewee was asked to elaborate on the measurement levels. These were then cross-checked with the literature in a likewise process as described above.
By identifying the proper measurement levels, the OCs' impact on capabilities could be defined, and any OC ambiguity could be minimized to avoid confusion and bias whilst discussing the OCs with the interviewees.
EVALUATING THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
The evaluation interviews were held with medior to senior domain experts in the fields of IT/EDP audit, security consulting, ethical hacking, and IS/IT research. The use of iterative cycles with a wide variety of experts "enables a progressive reconfiguration of substantive findings and interpretations in a pattern of increasing insight and sophistication" [5, p. 23] . The objective of the interviews was threefold: to discover new characteristics, to evaluate the characteristics found and to prioritize and extract the most crucial characteristics. As open discussions and questions are essential in this process, the usage of questionnaires or structured interviews was inapplicable [7, 19] . Semi-structured interviews allowed for this, while keeping guidance on the characteristics found and the focus areas in the ISFAM model. The focus of semistructured interviews also helped with the comparison between the responses of the different participants [19] . Each participant received an explanation of the research approach, a document that listed the found factors, clear definitions of important keywords and the ISFAM model. At the start of the interview the ISFAM model and OCs were explained and a small introduction was provided on the objective of the session. In each consecutive interview changes made to the list of OCs were carefully documented and clarified to guarantee new interviewees had sufficient knowledge on why some OCs were changed by others.
To reassure that the final list of questions is easy to understand and captured only the most important aspects-i.e. those that influence the number of IS capabilities that an organization should implement-we asked every interviewee to keep in mind the following factors as depicted in table 2. The number of questions must be limited, to lower the barrier for non-professionals to determine their IS maturity.
EXTRAPOLATING ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
The literature search yielded a total of 71 papers, book chapters and relevant white papers which had all characteristics extracted. These characteristics were double checked by the team of authors to assure correctness. This resulted in a total of 75 unique characteristics, ranging from organizational to technical to social descriptions. From these 75 characteristics, a short list was created. The selection process removed characteristics that are hard to measure according to either our experts or by nonexperts at SMEs whom eventually will use the model. For example a user's mother tongue [25] and user's intention [17] . Characteristics that were deemed too obvious were deleted from the list as well. For example, external factors such as legislation and bankruptcy influences information security [24, 32] , as well as minimizing the impact of vulnerabilities and incidents to reduce negative consequences from security incidents [12] . In addition, a number of characteristics describe ISFAM capabilities [32] . These overlapping characteristics were removed. A selection of these cases is depicted in table 3. Top management support [13, 24] Information Security Policy Development
Information security policy development is supported by senior management
A2
The effective marketing of security to all employees [13, 17] Information Security Policy Development
The policy documents are understood by the whole organization
C2
Risk Management Individuals in the organization are aware of the importance of risk management
A2
The degree of formalized processes and rules [29] Information Security Policy Development
There is a formal style for writing information security policy documents
B4
The lack of consistent risk management strategy [32] Risk Management Risk management processes are continuously improved.
D3
Risk Management Risk management is an integral part of the decision making process.
D4
The business users knowledge and intention regarding IS security [10, 27] Human Resources Security
All employees signed a document stating their roles and responsibilities to the organization.
B3
These steps of determining characteristics too hard to measure, characteristics that should be grouped and characteristics overlapping with capabilities from the ISFAM model, resulted in a shortlist of 26 unique characteristics. No less than 49 characteristics did not meet the aforementioned criteria. In addition, some characteristics were grouped and summarized.
EVALUATING THE ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
The experts in table 4 were selected for their knowledge in the field of information security. In the process of creating this selection, deep knowledge of the field, broad experience in performing risk analyses in the Netherlands, consulting on security topics and the relevance to SMEs was taken into account. To prevent bias, the backgrounds of the participants differ as well as their current roles. None of the participants work for the same employer, and none of them have worked together in a professional or educational setting. The experts participating provided valuable information regarding the 26 unique characteristics. Besides discussing the characteristics, experts also provided useful information regarding a number of related issues. These include:  Which OCs are relevant and which are not. Certain OCs are mentioned by the literature, but removed as they are deemed irrelevant or not applicable by multiple experts.  Which OCs are missing. Although our literature review was extensive, some OCs are based on the professional experiences from our experts. Characteristics identified by multiple experts are taken into account to be added to the final list.  Which OCs are relevant, but are not applicable to SMEs or have little impact on SMEs.
For example, average annual change in software and hardware is not applicable, as SMEs tend to change the majority of their software at once if they adopt for example a new version of Windows. Accounting for this is nearly impossible, and would thus skew the weights.
To structure the results of the interviews a number of factors are described for each of the 26 characteristics discussed, as shown in table 5. To keep the overview clear, we portray only a selection of key references per characteristic. In addition, the overview in table 5 includes the category each characteristic falls into, based on the consensus of the experts. Also, we depict whether we retain, merge, split or remove the characteristic and we provide the appropriate rationale derived from the interviews. Lastly, we portray the general opinion the interviewees had whether each characteristic should be retained for the shortlist or not. The sector of the organization provides ample information on the importance of proper information security, not only when dealing with regulation (explaining the merger with characteristic #1) but also when looking at the impact of for example data loss which is arguably higher in health and defense than in paper and logistics.
++
24 IT staff's knowledge of business processes [10, 13] General Remove Although literature stated this to influence a number of factors on how users take information security into account, the factor is hard to measure objectively when assessing organizational characteristics. In addition, interviewees felt this was not a key influence for many capabilities 0 25 Software in own development/maintenance Software in developed/maintained by external parties internally or externally [1, 29] IT complexity Split When discussing the influence of businesses developing, maintaining or outsourcing software, our interviewees argued that these characteristics are important. However, they felt that it was defined in a wrong way. Based on their remarks, two new OCs are proposed: "IT development in-& outsourcing" and "IT servicing in-& outsourcing". This prevents ambiguity surrounding the role of SLAs and which parties will be responsible for the change management processes. 
ORGANIZATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS
The rationale and action associated per identified OCs, as described in figure 3 -under the moniker CHOISS: CHaracterizing Organizations' Information Security for SMEs-presents the possibility to distinguish between a wide variety of different organizations. To reach a high information security maturity level, every organization has to implement a tailored set of focus areas and capabilities. In the following subsections each category is discussed and a number of examples are provided. 
A: GENERAL
The OCs in the general category are selected to provide a global view of the organization. The combination of the OCs sector, revenue, and number of employees together provide the ability to distinguish between a wide variety of organizations. For example when comparing two enterprises of similar size in number of employees, one of them might provide normal product services whereas the other provides mortgage services for a major bank. While the organization size would indicate similar capabilities need to be addressed, the fact that the organization is a financial service organization and the fact that the organization has a high revenue compared to its number of employees, additional capabilities would be required to reach a higher maturity level.
B: IN & OUTSOURCING
The OCs in the In & Outsourcing category are important due to the location where critical data is being stored, and in which manner the organization can rely other parties to deal with the proper handling of change management and backup & recovery processes. The difference can be explained in the following example: An organization runs 90% of its IT services as a Software as a Service (SaaS) product from reliable partners. However, 10% of its software is run and developed internally. In this situation the organization is required to implement a number of extra measurements regarding the change management processes of its software development, while a different organization, running all critical processes as SaaS would only need to look into Service Level Agreements.
C: IT DEPENDENCY
The third category is an important indicator how organizations need to address their information security practices. The OCs addressing these issues are fourfold: The importance of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) and the time an organization can do without IT. Each of the three parts from the CIA triad are closely linked to capabilities in the ISFAM model. By assessing the number of hours the business can run without IT, we get a clear idea on the dependency of the business on the IT environment. An example of these factors can be found when assessing a medium sized healthcare institution working with patient records. In this case maintaining confidentiality of the critical data is of high importance, as patient information holds sensitive personal information. In addition, integrity and a working IT environment assures the latest medical information about a patient can be provided, possibly saving lives. These factors combined require a higher number of capabilities which need to be addressed before a higher maturity level can be reached.
D: IT COMPLEXITY
Lastly, the fourth category gives an overview of the complexity of the IT environment. For example, by the revenue percentage being spent on IT and the number of employees employed in the IT department. These factors are of importance to grasp how much data are handled by IT in comparison to more conventional businesses focused on manual labour. For example, two similarly sized organizations active in the Utilities sector. One is solely focused on infrastructure maintenance while the other is responsible for managing the network and operations of a specific energy sector. Whilst on many organizational characteristics the organizations can be considered similar, the latter organization has a high expenditure on its IT environment, as multiple IT teams are on the premise to ensure uptime of the energy network. These differences in the complexity of IT impacts a large number of capabilities within ISFAM.
DISCUSSION & LIMITATIONS
An important issue with identifying these OCs and linking them to the ISFAM model to provide a tailored advice for SMEs is the possibility of missing measurements that should be implemented. There is no 'silver bullet' how to address a business' Information Security, and the authors realize the difficulty this brings when creating an off-the-shelf-solution. This research will therefore require continuous work to provide the best advice.
After assessing the items found in the literature review, grouping, removing and identifying overlapping factors with capabilities, we note how many scientific papers address single characteristics and their relation to Information Security. For instance the size of the organization [6, 11, 20, 23] or the protection of an organizations financial assets [8] . Most OCs are derived from written literature in the form of books, information retrieved from the international standardization organization (ISO) and other industry related papers and publications.
Another issue arises when looking into ambiguity. The SMEs' interpretation of the assessment can have a large impact when linking the OCs to the ISFAM. Experts noted how, for example, questions such as the ones related to the CIA-triad require a certain level of knowledge about these concepts for managers to answer them correctly. In addition, the ambiguity involved when interpreting terms such as critical information requires the final model to provide SMEs with proper and easy to understand definitions of the different terms and concepts. Possibly elaborating by providing relevant examples to further improve the comprehension of the concepts involved. Finally, based on the interviews and literature analysis of OCs, we note that quite a number of OCs turned out to be inapplicable, as they are specifically designed to distinguish between large enterprises. This is a strong indication which confirms our observation that research and current information system methodologies are still mostly focused on large enterprises. This research is part of our efforts to close this research gap by developing a lean and more specifically designed methodology for SMEs as a promising and highly relevant field of study.
CONCLUSION
This work describes exploratory research into the field of adaptive information security assessments targeted at SMEs. We performed a systematic literature review and assembled a total of 75 organizational factors. By grouping factors and removing factors not adhering to set criteria, we identified a long list of 26 OCs for information security in SMEs. For each of these OCs the levels of measurement were defined and a number of iterative interviews were held.
We have structured our final list of organizational characteristics in the CHaracterizing Organizations' Information Security for SMEs (CHOISS) model, which structures eleven OCs and its forty-seven measurement levels into the four categories General, In & Outsourcing, IT Dependency and IT Complexity. The General category pairs the number of employees, the organization's revenue and sector; the In & Outsourcing category encompasses the percentage of sourced software development and hosting/IT services; the IT Dependency category spans the importance of integrity, confidentiality, and availability of critical data, as well as the time the organization can do without IT support; the IT Complexity category joins the number of employees supporting the IT environment and the annual expenditure on IT over revenues. Each of these organizational characteristics can be used for future research to create a situational version of the ISFAM method to determine information security maturity for small and medium enterprises.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Currently the organizational characteristics are based on a comprehensive literature study and interviews with a number of information security professionals. We are now in the process of performing a number of case studies as the next logical next step to further validate the ISFAM model, and to analyze the organizational characteristics for future integration in the ISFAM assessment under the monniker Situational Process Improvement in Cybersecurity (SPICY), possibly augmenting and finalizing the list of factors.
Finally, our upcoming research on adaptive information security assessments will focus on how to develop a model which automatically identifies which OCs impact which focus areas and capabilities of the ISFAM maturity model. Especially the latter research component poses quite a challenge as it involves assessing no less than (64 ISFAM capabilities * 11 CHOISS OCs =) 704 impact relationships. The first step in this approach would be to prioritize the eleven OCs in their importance in distinguishing differences within an organization. Second, this research would need to explore for each measurement level, per OC, how this influences each individual focus area, and ideally each individual capability. By taking into account the relative influence of each OC, we would be automatically provided with a prioritization of importance of the capabilities in the ISFAM. This research has pinpointed the organizational characteristics which influence information security maturity in SMEs. This allows further research to realize tailor-made, fast, and easy-to-use information security advice for the often-forgotten majority of SMEs.
